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Abstract
We uncover a vulnerability that allows for an attacker to
perform an email-based attack on selected victims, using
only standard scripts and agents. What differentiates the
attack we describe from other, already known forms of
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks is that an at-
tacker does not need to infiltrate the network in any man-
ner — as is normally required to launch a DDoS attack.
Thus, we see this type of attack as a poor man’s DDoS.
Not only is the attack easy to mount, but it is also almost
impossible to trace back to the perpetrator. Along with
descriptions of our attack, we demonstrate its destruc-
tive potential with (limited and contained) experimental
results. We illustrate the potential impact of our attack
by describing how an attacker can disable an email ac-
count by flooding its inbox; block competition during on-
line auctions; harm competitors with an on-line presence;
disrupt phone service to a given victim; cheat in SMS-
based games; disconnect mobile corporate leaders from
their networks; and disrupt electronic elections. Finally,
we propose a set of countermeasures that are light-weight,
do not require modifications to the infrastructure, and can
be deployed in a gradual manner.
Keywords: Distributed Denial of Service, Email, SMS,
Web Forms, Agents
1 Introduction
The competitive advantage of most industrialized nations
depends on a well-oiled and reliable infrastructure, much
of which depends on the Internet to some extent. We show
how one very simple tool can be abused to bring down se-
lected sites, and argue how this in turn — if cunningly
performed — can do temporary but serious damage to a
given target. Here, the target may be a person, business
or institution relying on the Internet or the telephone net-
work for its day to day activities, but may also be more
indirectly dependent on the attacked infrastructure.
When assessing the damage a potential attack can in-
flict, it is important to recognize that attacks may carry
a substantial cost to society even if they do not obliter-
ate their targets — in particular if repeatedly perpetrated,
which becomes easier if the attacks are difficult to trace
back to their perpetrators. Furthermore, one should not
only take the direct costs into account, but also indirect
costs, namely those associated with not being able to rely
on the infrastructure.
When considering the (in)stability of our infrastructure,
it is also crucial to understand that the real target of an at-
tack may be a secondary and indirect one, whose relation
to the site being brought down may not be evident until
the attack takes place. Therefore, the target may not be
the least prepared for an attack of the type it would suf-
fer, making the blow even harder. For example, if voters
are allowed to cast votes using home computers or phones
(as in recent trials in Britain [9]), then an attack on some
voters or servers may invalidate the entire election, re-
quiring all voters to cast their votes again — for fairness,
this would include even those who used traditional means
in the first place. Other potential examples of secondary
damage include the general mobile phone system, the in-
frastructure for delivery of electricity from power plants
to consumers, and the traffic-balancing of the Interstate
highway system, given that these allow for load balancing
via the Internet in many places.
Approach. The attack involves Web crawling agents
that, posing as the victim, fill forms on a large set of third
party Web sites (the “launch pads”) causing them to send
emails or SMSs to the victim, or have phone calls placed.
The launch pads do not intend to do any damage — they
are merely tools in the hands of the attacker.
Our attack takes advantage of the absence in the current
infrastructure of a (non-interactive) technique for verify-
ing that the submitted email address or phone number cor-
responds to the user who fills in the form. This allows an
automated attacker to enter a victim’s email or number in
a tremendous number of forms, causing a huge volume of
messages to be directed to the victim’s mailbox. Depend-
ing on the quantity of generated messages, this may cost
the victim anything from lost time (sorting out what mes-
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sages to delete); to lost messages (if the mailbox fills up,
causing the Internet Service Provider (ISP) to bounce le-
gitimate emails); to a crash or other unavailability of some
of the victim’s or ISP’s machines.
We present experimental data indicating the ease of
mounting the attack; the time it takes to mount attacks
of certain sizes; and the time it takes for a certain quantity
of email to be generated by attacks of various sizes.
Potential victims. Our attack is applicable both to “con-
ventional” computers and to mobile devices, such as cel-
lular phones, PDAs, and other messaging devices. It is
easy to see that cellular phones with text messaging can
be attacked in the same way as normal email accounts.
Not only does this generate network congestion and un-
wanted costs, but it also causes the text messaging feature
of a mobile phone to be disabled once memory is filled
up. According to a quick test of ours, the memory of a
common cell phone model fills up after around 80 mes-
sages — an attack we performed in a few seconds. We
note that an attacker would not have to know what cell
phone numbers are in use in order to mount a general at-
tack on the service provider — he can simply attack large
quantities of numbers at random, many of which will be
actual numbers given the high density of used numbers.
This type of attack would allow an attacker to stop med-
ical doctors from being paged; inconvenience everyday
users of SMS; and cheat in location based games such as
Vodafone’s BotFighters.1 Moreover, an attacker can tar-
get all email accounts with names likely to correspond to
a given corporate leader and thereby render her mobile de-
vice unable to receive meaningful messages. This could
be done for the corporate domain as well as for all com-
mon providers of email and mobile connectivity.2
The common telephony infrastructure (both mobile and
wired) can be attacked in an analogous manner: by agents
entering a victim’s phone number in numerous forms.
If the remaining entered information is not consistent or
accurate, this may result in a representative of the cor-
responding company placing a phone call to straighten
things out, possibly after trying to send one or more mes-
sages to the email address entered in the form. Given the
higher cost of placing a phone call — compared to send-
ing an email — many companies prefer responding by
email, which is likely to require a larger number of forms
to be filled in by an attacker, in order to cause a compara-
ble call frequency. On the other hand, phone calls being
1This game (www.botfighters.com) is based on receiving and
sending SMSs. Since it does not require any special software to be
downloaded, it also cannot lock out messages from places other than
the game center. This allows users with knowledge of another player’s
phone number to mount a denial of service attack, efficiently paralyzing
the victim.
2If the names of the victims are not known, an attacker can mount a
dictionary attack in combination with the DDoS attack we describe.
more disruptive than email messages, the impact of the
attack types may be comparable for a given attack size.
Defenses. What complicates the design of countermea-
sures is the fact that there is nothing per se that distin-
guishes a malicious request for information from a desired
request in the eyes of the launch pad site, making the latter
oblivious to the fact that it is being used in an attack. This
also makes legislation against unwanted emails, SMSs
and phone calls [8] a meaningless deterrent: without the
appropriate technical mechanisms to distinguish valid re-
quests from malicious ones, how could a site be held liable
when used as a launch pad? To further aggravate the is-
sues, and given that our attack is a type of DDoS attack, it
will not be possible for the victim (or nodes acting on its
behalf) to filter out high-volume traffic emanating from a
suspect IP address, even if we ignore the practical prob-
lems associated with spoofing of such addresses.
The standard defense against impersonation of users is
not useful to avoid the generation of network traffic. In
particular, some sites attempt to establish that a request
emanated with a given user by sending the user an email
to which he is to respond in order to complete the registra-
tion or request. However, as far as our email-based attack
is concerned, it makes little difference whether the emails
sent to a victim are responses to requests, or simply emails
demanding an acknowledgement.
While it may appear that the simplicity and general-
ity of the attack would make it difficult to defend against,
this is fortunately not the case. We propose (1) simple ex-
tensions of known techniques whereby well-intentioned
Web sites can protect themselves from being exploited
as launch pads for our attack, and (2) a set of heuristic
techniques whereby users can protect themselves against
becoming victims. Our countermeasures are light-weight
and simple, require no modifications of the communica-
tion infrastructure, and can be deployed gradually.
Outline: We begin by describing how an attack can
be mounted using standard agent-based techniques (sec-
tion 2), noting how easy it is for an attacker to remain
untraceable. We then present experimental data support-
ing the strength of the attack (section 3), followed by a
brief survey of possible targets of attack (section 4). We
then propose some techniques to secure potential launch
pads and targets of different kinds (section 5), noting that
not all targets can use the same defense techniques. We
finally discuss related work and some open problems re-
lated to defense against agent-mounted attacks (section 6).
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2 The Attack
2.1 Description of Vulnerability
Many sites allow a visitor to request information or sub-
scribe to a newsletter. A user initiates a request by enter-
ing her contact information in a form, possibly along with
additional information. Figure 1 shows a typical form.
Our attack takes advantage of the fact that, in the cur-
rent Web infrastructure (e.g., HTTP protocol), there is no
way to verify that the information a user enters corre-
sponds to the true identity or address of the user. Thus it is
possible to request information on behalf of another party.
Agents — or automated scripts acting as users — allow
this to be performed on a large scale, thereby transform-
ing the illegitimate requests from a poor practical joke to
an attack able of bringing down the victim’s site.
2.2 Finding the Victim
In many instances, the attacker may know the email ad-
dress or phone number of the victim, or may be able to ex-
tract it from postings to newsgroups, replies in an auction
setting, etc. In other cases, the address may be unknown.
If the attacker wishes to target the corporate leaders of a
given company, he has to determine what their likely ad-
dresses are, which typically are limited to a few combina-
tions of first and last names. In order to target mobile de-
vices, such as Blackberries, the attacker would also target
the appropriate wireless service providers, again targeting
all names that match the victim(s). In order to target a
service provider, a massive attack of this type is also pos-
sible. To wreak havoc in an electronic election in which
users are allowed to use their own computers and wireless
devices, it suffices to target a few voters, who will later
complain that they were locked out. It is even possible
for an attacker to block his own device (stopping himself
from voting) in order to later be able to lodge a complaint
and have the election results questioned.
2.3 Phase I: Harvesting Suitable Forms
Many Web sites use forms to execute scripts that will col-
lect one or more email addresses and add them to one or
more lists. There are many legitimate ways in which the
collected emails can be used: mailing lists for newslet-
ters, alert services, postcards, sending articles or pages to
friends, etc. There are less legitimate uses as well, for ex-
ample many sites collect emails by advertising freebies of
various sorts, and then sell the email lists to spammers as
“opt-in” requests.
One way for an attacker to automatically locate and col-
lect forms to be used as launch pads is by employing a
topic-driven crawler [6, 7]. Such a software searches the
base = (free email newsletter);
list = (alert subscribe opt-in list spam
porn contest prize stuff travel ezine
market stock joke sign verify money
erotic sex god christ penis viagra age
notify news recipe gratis libre livre);
foreach set = subset(list) {
query(base plus(set) minus(list - set));
}
Figure 2: Pseudocode that illustrates how queries can be
designed to harvest Web forms from a search engine.
Web in a focused way trying to find pages similar to a
given description. The description could be a query that
yields many pages with email-collecting forms.
An even more straightforward approach is for an agent
to harvest forms from the Web by posting appropriate
queries directly to some search engine. The agent can
then fetch the hit pages to extract forms. For example
MSN reports about 5 million hits for the query “free email
newsletter” and over 800,000 hits for “send free SMS.”
However, search engines often do not return more than
some maximum number of hits (say, 1,000). One way
for the attacker’s software to get around this obstacle is
to create many query combinations by including positive
and/or negative term requests. These combinations can be
designed to yield large sets of hits with little overlap. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates how to create such queries automatically.
Once a potential page is identified, it must be parsed
by the agent to extract form information. The page may
actually not contain a form, or contain a form that cannot
be used as a launch pad. A heuristic approach can be used
to identify suitable forms. For example, there must be at
least one text input field and either its name or its default
value must match a string like “email.” Such a heuristic
identifies potential launch pad forms with high probabil-
ity. In our experiments, using a search engine with queries
as shown in Figure 2 leads to a form harvest rate of about
40%. In other words, the heuristic yields about 4 potential
launch pad forms from each 10 search engine hits.
Once suitable Web form URLs are collected, they could
be shared among attackers much like email address lists
are exchanged among spammers. The harvest rate would
then be 100%. It is easy to write software that parses the
HTML code of a Web page and extracts form information.
This consists of a URL for the form action, the method
(GET/POST), and a set of input fields, each with a name,
a type/domain, and possibly a default value. The form
information can be stored in a database.
2.4 Phase II: Automatically Filling Forms
A form can be filled and submitted automatically, either
immediately upon discovery, or at a later time based on
the stored form’s information. Heuristics can be used to
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<form action="newsletter.php"
method="POST">
<input type="text"
name="Email"
value="your email here!">
<input type="submit"
name="submit"
value="Subscribe">
</form>
Figure 1: A typical Web form that can be exploited by our attack (left), and the HTML code that can be used to detect,
parse, and submit such a form (right).
assign values to the various input fields. These include the
victim’s email address and, optionally, other information
such as name, phone, etc. Other text fields can be left
blank or filled with junk. Fields that require a single value
from a set (radio buttons, drop-down menus) can be filled
with a random option. Fields that allow multiple values
(checkboxes, lists) can be filled in with all options.
Once all input names have an associated value, an
HTTP request can be assembled based on the form’s
method. Finally, sending the request for the action URL
corresponds to submitting the filled form. For efficiency,
forms can be filled and submitted in parallel by concurrent
processes or threads.
This phase of the attack requires a form database, which
could be a simple text file, and a small program that
fills forms acting like a Web user agent (browser). The
program could be executed from a public computer, for
example in a library or a coffee shop. All that is re-
quired is an Internet connection. The program could be
installed from a floppy disk, downloaded from a Web or
FTP server, or even invoked via an applet or a virus.
2.5 Poorly Behaved Sites
There are many poorly behaved sites that may not care
whether the entered contact information corresponds to
the Web page visitor or a potential victim. The reason
is simple: these sites derive benefit from the collection
of valid email addresses, whatever their origin may be.
The benefit may be the actual use of these addresses, or
the sale of the same. For example, it is believed that the
age verification scripts of many porn sites are simply dis-
guised collectors of email addresses. We note that posting
an email address to such a site may result in what we re-
fer to as a snow-balling effect, i.e., a situation in which a
submitted email address results in several emails, as the
email address is bought, sold, and used.
The snow-ball effect can be exploited to maximize
damage by generating a large-volume, persistent stream
of email toward the victim. An efficient approach to max-
imize the number of spammers who obtain the victim’s
email is to post it on newsgroups and chatrooms, which
are regularly and automatically scanned by spammers to
harvest fresh email addresses. This approach does not
even require one to collect and fill Web forms; but it has a
more delayed, long-term effect.
2.6 Well Behaved Sites
While it is evident that the vulnerability we describe is
made worse if the launch pads of the attack are poorly
behaved sites, we argue that an attacker also can take ad-
vantage of well behaved sites. These are sites that may
not sell the email address entered in the form, and who
may wish to verify that it corresponds to a legitimate re-
quest for information. However, as previously mentioned,
this typically involves sending an email to the address en-
tered in the form, requesting an acknowledgement before
more information is sent. This email, while perhaps not
as large as the actual requested information, also becomes
part of the attack as confirmation messages flood the vic-
tim’s mailbox.
Moreover, if the intention of the form is to allow a user
to send information to a friend, the above measures of
caution are not taken. Examples of sites allowing such re-
quests are electronic postcard services, many online news-
papers, and more.
An attacker may also pose as a buyer to an e-commerce
site, entering the victim’s email address along with other
information, such as an address and potentially incorrect
credit card information. This would cause one or more
emails to be sent to the victim. Given that the victim
would not likely respond to any of these, the company
may attempt to call the phone number entered in the form,
which would constitute a potential attack in itself.
4
2.7 On the Difficulty of Tracing an Attacker
As described, the attack consists of two phases: one in
which suitable forms are harvested and a second in which
the forms are filled and submitted. While it is possible
for a site to determine the IP address of a user filling a
form, not all sites may have the apparatus in place to do
so. Moreover, given the very short duration of the second
phase (see section 3), it is easy for an attacker to perform
this part of the attack using a public machine as shown
above.
While the first phase of the attack typically takes more
time, this can be performed once for a large number of
consecutive attacks. Even if the first phase of the at-
tack takes place from an identifiable computer and using a
search engine, it is difficult for the search engine to recog-
nize the intent of an attacker from the queries, especially
considering the large numbers of queries handled. And
it is impossible for a launch pad site to determine how
its form was found by the attacker, whether a search en-
gine was used, which one, and in response to what query.
In other words, the second phase of the attack cannot be
traced to the first (possibly traceable) phase.
Finally, the possibility of an attack — or parts thereof
— being mounted by a virus (and therefore, from the ma-
chine of an innocent person) further frustrates any remain-
ing hopes of meaningful traces.
3 Experimental Data
3.1 Experimental Setup
Here we report on a number of contained experiments car-
ried out to demonstrate the ease of mounting the attack
and its potential damage. We focus on email (as opposed
to SMS) attacks in these experiments. We are interested
in how many email messages, and how much data, can be
targeted to a victim’s mailbox as a function of time since
the start of an attack. We also want to measure how long
it would take to disable a typical email account.
Clearly these measurements, and the time taken to
mount an attack, depend on the number of forms used.
It would not be too difficult to mount an attack with, say,
105 or 106 forms. However, much smaller attacks suf-
fice to disable a typical email account by filling its in-
box. Furthermore, experimenting with truly large-scale
attacks would present ethical and legal issues that we do
not want to raise. Therefore we limit our experiments to
very contained attacks, aiming to observe how the potency
of an attack scales with its computational and storage re-
source requirements. We created a number of temporary
email accounts and used them as targets of attacks of dif-
ferent sizes. Each attack used a different number of Web
forms, sampled randomly from a collection of about 4,000
launch pads, previously collected.
In the collection phase of the attack, we used a “form-
sniffing” agent to search the Web for appropriate forms
based on hits from a search engine, using the technique
described in section 2. The MSN search engine was used
because it does not disallow crawling agents via the robot
exclusion standard.3 This was done only once.
The collection agent was implemented as a Perl script
using no particular optimizations (e.g., no timeouts) and
employing off-the-shelf modules for Berkeley database
storage, HTML parsing, and the LWP library for HTTP.
The agent crawled approximately 110 hit pages per
minute, running on a 466 MHz PowerMac G4 with a
100 Mbps Internet connection. This configuration is not
unlike what would be available at a copy store. From our
sample we measured a harvest rate of 40% (i.e. 40 launch
pad forms per 100 search engine hits) with a standard er-
ror of 3.5%. At this harvest rate, the agent collected al-
most 50 launch pad forms per minute, and almost 4,000
forms in less than 1.5 hours. If run in the background
(e.g., in the form of a virus), this would produce as many
as 72,000 forms in one day, or a million forms in two
weeks — probably in significantly less time with some
simple optimizations.
The second phase, repeated for attacks of different size,
was carried out using the same machinery and similarly
implemented code. A “form-filling” agent took a victim’s
information (email and name) as input, sampled forms
from the database, and submitted the filled forms. The
agent filled approximately 116 forms per minute. We call
attack time the time required to mount an attack with a
given number of forms.
3.2 Results
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how the number of messages in
the victim’s inbox and the inbox size, respectively, grow
over time after the attack is mounted. The plots highlight
two distinct dynamic phases. While the attack is taking
place, some fraction of the launch pad forms generate im-
mediate messages toward the target. These responses cor-
respond to an initial high growth rate. Shortly after the
attack is over, the initial responses cease and a second
phase begins in which messages continue to arrive at a
lower, constant rate. These are messages that are sent by
launch pads at regular intervals (e.g., daily newsletters),
repeat acknowledgment requests, and spam. In the plots,
we fit this dynamic behavior to the model
MF (t) = (aF · t + bF ) tanh(cF · t) (1)
3We wanted to preserve the ethical behavior of the agent used in our
experiments; an actual attacker could use any search engine since the
robot exclusion standard is not enforceable.
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Figure 3: Number of messages received by victim versus
time for attacks of different size.
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Figure 4: Victim’s inbox storage versus time for attacks
of different size. The account is killed when the inbox
reaches 2 MB.
where MF (t) is the inbox size or number of messages
at time t (t = 0 is the start of the attack), for an attack
with F forms. The constants aF , bF , cF are determined
by a nonlinear least-squares fit of the model to the data.
The linear part of the model corresponds to the long-term
growth, and aF is the stable arrival rate once the imme-
diate responses have subsided, after the end of the at-
tack. The hyperbolic tangent is a simple way to model the
faster initial arrival rate. The initial phase is over when
tanh(cF · t ≫ 0) ≈ 1.
The email traffic generated by our attacks was mon-
itored until the size of the inbox passed a threshold of
2 MB. This is a typical quota on free email accounts such
as Hotmail and Yahoo. No other mail was sent to the vic-
tim accounts, and no mail was deleted during the exper-
iments. When an inbox is full, further email is bounced
back to senders and, for all practical purposes, the email
account is rendered useless unless the victim makes a sig-
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Figure 5: Attack size necessary to kill an account in an
hour versus victim’s quota.
nificant effort to delete messages. We call kill time the
time between the start of an attack and the point when the
inbox size reaches 2 MB.
In Figures 3 and 4 we can observe that for the three
smaller attacks (F = 514, 1026, 2050) kill time occurs
well after the attack has terminated. For the largest attack
(F = 3911), kill time occurs while the attack is still being
mounted. This is mirrored by the fact that this attack is
still in the initial phase of high response rate when the
inbox fills up.
One can use the data of Figure 4 and the model of Equa-
tion 1 to analyze how large an attack would be necessary
to kill an account in a given amount of time, as a function
of the account quota. Figure 5 shows the number of forms
that in our experiments would kill an account in one hour,
corresponding to a lunch hour attack, in which the vic-
tim’s machine is disabled while she is temporarily away.
The number of forms scales sub-linearly, as a power law
F ∼ q0.7 where q is the account quota. We can think of
this as a manifestation of the snow-ball effect — periodic
alerts and spam compound immediate responses making
the attack more efficient.
Figure 6 shows how the arrival rate of email in the vic-
tim’s mailbox scales with the size of the attack. The ar-
rival rate for an attack of size F is given by the growth
parameter aF , obtained by fitting the model in Equation 1
to the data in Figure 4. As illustrated by the least-squared
fit in Figure 6, the arrival rate appears to scale exponen-
tially: aF ∼ e0.0019F . Such a non-linear scaling behav-
ior is surprising; it is the result of the fact that a3911 is
the short-term (not long-term) growth rate, as the attack
is still being mounted. If we only consider the long-term
growth rate and assume there is no snow-ball effect, the
arrival rate should scale linearly with F . To illustrate this,
Figure 6 also plots a linear fit of the arrival rate data for
the small attacks: aF ∼ 0.06F for F ≤ 2050.
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Finally, Figure 7 shows how attack time and kill time
scale with the size of the attack. As expected attack time
is proportional to F . Kill time (cf. Figure 4) scales as
a power law: t ∼ F−3.2. Again, this non-linear scaling
behavior is a consequence of the snow-ball effect, which
amplifies the destructive effect of the attack and makes it
possible to kill an email account efficiently. In fact the
intersection between attack and kill time in Figure 7 in-
dicates that there is no need to mount attacks with more
than F ≈ 212 forms if the goal is to disable an account
with a 2 MB quota.
4 Survey of Vulnerable Targets
Attacking known targets. First of all, it is clear that an
attacker could simply target users with email addresses
known to him, including addresses that result in a text
message being sent to a cellular phone or other mobile
device. Many people make their email addresses known
to the public, whether in machine readable format or not;
many companies rely on making public addresses to cos-
tumer service (making them susceptible to attacks both
from competitors and people who disagree with their poli-
cies or merchandise); and oftentimes, politicians make
both their phone numbers and email addresses available
to the public. (While these certainly are not their home
phone numbers or email addresses given to fellow politi-
cians, they are important means for their constituents to
reach them.) Some eBay users appear to use their email
addresses as identifiers, making it easy to block these from
any competition during an auction.4 A large portion of the
remaining set of eBay users can be conned into giving out
their email address: simply ask them an innocuous ques-
tion relating to a previous transaction of theirs (using the
supplied Web interface) and the reply will contain their
email address. Furthermore, many banks use email for
internal and external communication, opening up for an
attack on their computers. Many journalists and law en-
forcement officers rely on phone and email for leads and
pointers.
Attacking random targets. Given that many compa-
nies use highly predictable formatting for email addresses,
it may be possible for an attacker to mount an attack on
people believed to work for the company, or on people
with common names, which in the end may amount to
an attack of the company itself. Furthermore, an attacker
can use the very same tools spammers use to harvest and
purchase valid email addresses, filtering these to suit the
profile of his attack. People can be attacked based on their
likely geographical location by selecting phone numbers
with given area codes. Even if a rather small percentage
of randomly selected phone numbers correspond to ac-
tual cell phones with text messaging capabilities, the price
of mounting an attack is so low that an attacker may try
random numbers. If a phone-based attack is mounted, an
attacker may use on-line phone books to select victims,
whether the selection of the victims is automated or man-
ual, and whether it is targeted or random.
Politically motivated attacks. If a large number of ran-
dom mobile devices are attacked during an electronic
election, it is highly probable that some voters will be un-
able to cast their vote. While this is not likely to swing the
election results, unless the attack is severe, it will cause
the results, and the fairness of these, to be questioned.
This may especially be so if the targeted phone numbers
4This attack succeeds unless the victim has already entered a suffi-
ciently high maximum bid, allowing eBay to act on their behalf. Still,
though, if a winning bidder’s email account is successfully disabled be-
fore the payment has been performed, the victim will not be able to re-
spond to the seller, making the latter likely to contact the second-highest
bidder or re-run the auction.
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correspond to particularly rich or poor voting districts, or
to districts with higher proportions of certain minorities.
Apart from attacking the political infrastructure (which
may cause disruption, particularly during elections), an
attacker may attempt to target people of certain ethnici-
ties or nationalities by performing filtering based on par-
ticular names or affiliations. Attackers may target people
based on their likely opinions or inclinations by harvest-
ing email addresses from selected bulletin boards, or by
performing a focused crawl for given keywords on per-
sonal Web pages. Attackers may attempt to bring down
selected email-based chatrooms by generating traffic to
them — notice that it does not matter whether they are
moderated or not, since a moderator cannot approve good
posts if the bad ones are just too overwhelming.
5 Defense Mechanisms
We now describe a set of related defense techniques for
our DDoS attack. A first line of defense consists of a sim-
ple preventive step by which Web sites can avoid being
exploited as launch pads in our attack. For Web sites that
have not yet complied with this preventive step, as well
as unscrupulous spammer sites that have no intention to
verify the legitimacy of requests, we describe a second
line of defense for the detection and management of such
attacks by potential victims. The second line of defense
consists of a heuristic approach, whose use can be adapted
to different situations of interest; we focus on three typical
entities that differ in the types of emails they are likely to
receive: an individual, an on-line store, and a politician.
5.1 Prevention of Attacks
Many sites that allow users to subscribe to email services
such as newsletters and alerts employ mailto links (ei-
ther to a person or to a listserv manager, e.g., Majordomo).
These sites cannot be exploited as launch pads, because
the attacker would need a mail transport agent, e.g. a ma-
chine running a SMTP server or an external mail relay.
Such an attack is possible, but more difficult to carry out
from a public computer and also more easily detectable
and traceable. Open relays are rare and often blocked by
ISPs anyway (because they are used by spammers), and a
“legitimate” SMTP server requires some level of authen-
tication that would allow to identify or trace the attacker.
The obvious preventive solution to the proposed attack is
thus to disable Web forms and enforce the use of email-
based listserv tools such as Majordomo. However, this
would disallow useful Web forms in which users can en-
ter additional information — this cannot be done conve-
niently with a simple mailto link to a listserv. To allow
for the use of forms as appropriate while still verifying the
legitimacy of email service requests, well behaved sites
currently send a message to the submitted email address
requesting confirmation that the address corresponds to a
legitimate user request. As we observed earlier this be-
havior is exploited in our attack because confirmation re-
quests, even if not repeated (as they often are), contribute
to flooding the victim’s mailbox just as any other message.
It is possible to both enable Web form requests and ver-
ify the legitimacy of requests, without becoming vulnera-
ble to our attack. Web sites would use the following sim-
ple strategy. After the form has been filled out, the Web
site creates dynamically a page containing a mailto link
with itself as an addressee. Legitimate users would send
the message to validate their request. The email to the
Web site would then be used by the site’s mailing list
manager to verify that the sender matches the email ad-
dress submitted via the Web form. Although the address
of the sender is not reliable because it can be spoofed in
the SMTP protocol, the sender cannot spoof the IP address
of its legitimate ISP’s SMTP server. The site can thus ver-
ify that the email address in the form request matches the
originating SMTP server in the validation message.
There are three caveats to this strategy. First, messages
via open relays must be discarded by the site. Second, if
an attacker could guess that a user in a given domain re-
quests information from some site, she could request in-
formation from the same site for other users in the same
domain, potentially spoofing the validation created by the
addressee. To prevent such an attack, the validation mes-
sage created by the site should contain a number with suf-
ficient entropy that it is hard to guess. Third, one could
still attack victims who share their ISP’s mail server. In
general this would be somewhat suicidal, but a disgruntled
employee might use such an attack against his employer.
In this case, however, the attack could be traced. Fur-
thermore, our heuristic defense mechanisms — presented
next — will address such an attack. With these caveats,
our preventive strategy would afford the same security as
forms that now request email confirmation, but without
sending any email to victims.
The above technique works for forms where a party re-
quests information to be sent to herself, but it does not
cover common services such as sending newspaper arti-
cles or postcards to others. Sites wishing to allow this can
use alternative defenses. Namely, well behaved sites may
make the harvesting of forms more difficult by not label-
ing forms using HTML, but rather, using small images.
This would increase the effort of finding and filling the
forms. Given the relative abundance of available forms,
potential attackers are then likely to turn to other sites
where no image analysis has to be performed to find and
fill the form. Doing this has no impact on human users,
except to a very small extent on the download time of the
form. A more robust version of this defense would use an
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inverse Turing test or CAPTCHA (Completely Automatic
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart)
[11, 10], a technique already employed by many sites to
prevent agents from impersonating human users.
If legislation is brought in place that makes sites li-
able for any attacks mounted using their facilities [8], then
even poorly behaved sites may wish to employ protective
measures as those described above to avoid being the de-
fendants in lawsuits by victims of the attack we describe.
5.2 Detection and Management of Attacks
In the previous subsection, we considered how well-
behaved sites can protect themselves against being used
as launch pads. Since it is not likely that all sites will
comply with these protective measures, we also need to
consider protection against poorly behaved and otherwise
non-compliant sites. This protection will reside on the
side of the potential victim, whether on his machine or on
his mail server. Before detailing the defense mechanisms,
let us introduce three tools that these will employ:
Extended Address Book. Most users maintain an ad-
dress book in which they enter the email addresses of
their most frequent correspondents. We consider the
use of an additional address book, what we will refer
to as the extended address book. This contains the
email addresses of all parties the user has sent email
to or received email from, along with a time stamp
indicating when the last email was sent or received.
To reduce the required storage, we may allow users
to have entries automatically removed after their cor-
responding date stamp reaches a given age selected
by the user. The extended address book is similar to
the whitelists maintained by spam filters; the main
difference is that it would only be used for filtering
purposes when an attack is suspected, as described
below. Emails of spammers might even be included.
When deemed beneficial, a set of users may share
one and the same extended address book.
Attack Meter. We will let the system estimate the
probability that a given user is under attack at any
given time. The parameters considered would be the
amount of traffic to the user in relation to the normal
amount of traffic to her, and relative to the traffic of
other users; the proportion of emails arriving to the
user (and her peers) that originate from users that are
not in their extended address books; and the number
of duplicate emails received by users handled by the
mail server. The calibration of the estimation may be
performed with a given threat situation in mind.
Cleaner. During a clean-up, a set of suspect emails are
removed from the inbox of the user. Depending on
the situation, it may be that all suspect emails are re-
moved; all suspect emails of some certain minimum
size; all suspect emails from (or not from) given do-
mains; or some other, potentially customized selec-
tion of all suspect emails. The mail server may auto-
matically respond to the sender, notifying them that
their email was erased, potentially using a notifica-
tion customized by the recipient.
Defense of an individual. When a user accesses his ac-
count, he would be shown the likely probability, according
to the attack meter, that he is under attack. If the user in-
dicates that he believes he is under attack, the mail server
would automatically mark all emails that are from senders
who are not in the extended address book as suspect, and
proceed to perform a clean-up. This may also be induced
by the system — without the request of the user — if the
user is not available, an attack is judged to likely be under
progress, and resources are scarce. These defenses could
reside either on the user side, or on the side of the service
provider, as is appropriate for wireless devices. If resid-
ing with the provider, the attack meter can also take the
general attack situation in consideration when determin-
ing whether an individual is being attacked. We note that
this solution also secures list moderators at the expense
of not being able to receive messages from new posters
during the time of an attack; note also that the risk of the
launch pads already being in the extended address book
of the moderator is slim.
If a person wants to always be able to receive high-
priority messages, then he can download email from mul-
tiple sources (e.g., using POP), and use an obscure ad-
dress for the high-priority email. This address would only
be known by the senders of high-priority messages, and
would have sufficient entropy to make a dictionary attack
improbable to succeed. If the user believes he is under at-
tack, he can switch from synchronizing his device with all
ISPs he uses to only the ISP of the high-priority account.
This provides an increased level of protection against at-
tacks for people on call, such as technical support staff,
medical doctors, and more.
Defense of an online store. If considered under attack,
the mail server would mark emails as suspect if they orig-
inate from a user who is not in the extended address book,
unless this user is a known collector of email from other
sources. For an example of the latter, consider how eBay
users establish communication with each other: via the
messaging interface of eBay. Thus, eBay serves the role
of an email collector, and associated emails would be han-
dled using particular rules. For example, the mail server
may mark a set of emails as suspect if arriving in large
quantities from one and the same user pseudonym; if asso-
ciated with a newly established user pseudonym; or with a
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user pseudonym with limited or low feedback. After this,
the clean-up is started.
Defense of a politician. A politician may have set up
an email account to enable communication with his con-
stituents. Many of these are likely to use accounts with
one of a very small set of known ISPs. In contrast, com-
panies responding to forms are likely not to have the same
domains. Therefore, under attack, the mail server could
mark as suspect those emails that do not come from the
known ISPs likely to correspond to the wanted senders.
Furthermore, the mail server may mark emails as suspects
if coming from other countries — when indicated by the
corresponding domain — as these are also unlikely to be
from constituents.
5.3 Synergy between Defense of Launch
Pads and Victims
It is important that the heuristic defense mechanisms pro-
posed do not disrupt desired functionality, thus it must still
be possible for a user to fill forms and receive information
sent to him. Indeed this will still be possible — even dur-
ing a detected attack — as long as the site with the form
sends email from an address that is present in the extended
address book of the party requesting information.
In the strategy described above to prevent Web sites
from being exploited as launch pads, the user who sub-
mits a request through a form must send a validation mes-
sage (dynamically created and self-addressed) to the Web
site. This step causes the Web site’s email address to be
entered into the user’s extended address book. As a result
the information sent to the user by the site is not filtered
out. This creates an incentive for sites to comply with the
preventive strategy, not only to avoid being exploited but
also to keep their messages from being filtered out.
6 Discussion
We investigated an automated and agent-based DDoS at-
tack in which a victim is swamped by communication
from entities believing she requested information. The
primary tool of the attack is that of Web forms, which
can be automatically harvested and filled out by an agent.
The automatic recognition and extraction of forms from
Web pages using simple heuristics is not a new concept.
For example it has been applied to the design of com-
parison shopping agents aimed at searching for products
from multiple vendor sites [4]. The problem is only a bit
harder if an account must be set up before a a form can be
submitted. For instance many sites allow only registered
users to send SMSs to any number. However, setting up
an account is free and can easily be automated — this is
why, e.g., Hotmail and Yahoo use CAPTCHAs to prevent
spammers from setting up fake accounts automatically.5
During a denial of service attack a large number of con-
nections is set up with a victim, thereby exhausting the
resources of the latter. A distributed denial of service at-
tack is mounted from multiple directions, thereby making
it more difficult to defend against. There exist many au-
tomated tools to mount DDoS attacks [2, 3, 5]. These re-
quire that the attacker takes control of a set of computers
from which he will launch the attack. This, in turn, makes
DDoS attacks more difficult to perform for a large portion
of potential offenders. It also offers a certain degree of
traceability since the take-over of launch pad computers
may set off an alarm. The poor man’s DDoS attack illus-
trated here can be mounted without the need to take over
any launch pad computer, and offers the offender an al-
most certain guarantee of untraceability — due both to its
swiftness and to the fact that it utilizes only steps that are
also performed by benevolent users.
We described a novel, very simple strategy by which
Web sites can avoid being exploited in the poor man’s
DDoS attack; once a majority of Web sites comply with
this strategy, such attacks will be prevented.
For the interim, we have proposed a set of heuris-
tic techniques to inoculate users against the poor man’s
DDoS attack. These mechanisms only allow emails to
be filtered out if they are sent from sites that are not in
a user’s extended address book. While there is no cryp-
tographic mechanism to avoid IP spoofing, this is not a
major threat because it is not the attacker who would have
to spoof the IP address of the sender of the email, but the
launch pad site. Well behaved sites will clearly not do
this, and if poorly behaved sites are willing to, then they
become part of the aggressor, and not merely a tool in its
hand. What makes our attack severe is that the launch
pads would be oblivious to the role they are playing, and
that is not the case if they perform IP spoofing. If a site
is willing to spoof IP addresses, there are clearly simpler
DoS attacks such as mailbombs that do not involve Web
forms or agents.
Our attack is an extension and variant of the recent
work by Byers, Rubin and Kormann [1], in which an at-
tack was described where victims are inundated by phys-
ical mail. While the underlying principles are the same,
the ways the attacks are performed, and what they achieve,
are different. By generalizing to mostly all types of com-
munication, our attack becomes a weapon in the hands of
an attacker wishing to attack secondary targets as well as
primary ones. Moreover, the defenses proposed in the two
5Incidentally, it would be beneficial for eBay to do so as well during
the account creation phase, or their service remains vulnerable against an
agent based attack in which a large number of accounts are created and
later used for disruptive purposes. One such disruptive purpose would be
to bid up on items — without later paying for them — thereby blocking
legitimate bidding.
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papers vary considerably, given both the different threat
situations and the different goals in terms of systems to be
secured. We consider both how to secure entities against
becoming victims and how to secure sites against being
exploited as launch pads, while the work of [1] only con-
siders the latter. This strengthens our defenses in the face
of poorly behaved Web sites, and non-compliant sites.
We have not investigated the generation of traffic by
means of posting messages to newsgroups, chatrooms and
bulletin boards, purportedly from the victim, but believe
such attacks to be similar to those we discussed, and pos-
sible to defend against in similar manners.
There are more drastic types of defense measures that
can protect from the attack described in this paper. For
example some ISPs are considering CAPTCHA based
challenge-response systems in conjunction with whitelists
to combat spam.6 While such an approach would indeed
protect a potential victim from the email DDoS attack,
it would also decrease the accessibility of email. Many
email-based transactions, such as e-commerce confirma-
tions, would also be blocked. The defenses we have de-
scribed are more targeted at the DDoS attack, more light-
weight, and do not require modifications to the email in-
frastructure.
At a more general level, the kind of attack described
here raises new issues with social, ethical, legal and po-
litical implications for the use and integration of mod-
ern communication media such as the Internet, electronic
messaging, and mobile telephony. For example, if users
were required to identify themselves when using the In-
ternet in order to prevent such abuses, then one could no
longer use a computer anonymously in a public place such
as a library. We hope that this work will spark a fruitful
debate on these issues, leading to solutions that will pro-
tect our inboxes as well as our privacy and freedom of
speech.
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